Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Parking Facilities
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by Mary S. Smith

1. Mary S. Smith is Vice President and Director of Parking Consulting and Study Services for Walker Parking Consultants. This report was supported by NIJ grant 91-IJ-CX-K022, awarded to the American Institute of Architects.

**Issues and Findings**
Discussed in this Research in Brief: How Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts can be applied to parking facilities along with active security measures such as guards and emergency communication systems.

Key issues: Because parking facilities comprise a large volume of space with relatively low levels of activity, violent crime is more likely to occur in a parking facility than in other commercial facilities.

Many parking facilities lack CPTED design features because most property owners and architects are not familiar with the basic principles of design concepts for crime prevention.

Zoning ordinances and building codes can sometimes hinder effective use of CPTED principles. Examples include requiring landscaping to screen parking facilities, placing height limits on light poles, and mandating enclosure of exit stairs.

Although CPTED principles can be readily incorporated into parking facilities at design and construction stages, it is often difficult and expensive to upgrade security at a later date.

Key findings: Municipal governments can have a major influence on building design, and local officials can play a much stronger role in fostering security planning.

The single most important CPTED security feature is lighting. Lighting codes should meet the standards of the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America.

Elevator lobbies and stairs in open parking garages should be open to the parking areas except at roof levels where glass enclosures may be provided for weather protection.

Where possible, elevators and stairs should be located on the perimeter to permit natural surveillance from exterior public areas via glass-back elevators and glass at stairs and elevator lobbies.

Access control and perimeter security should always be considered in the initial design stage. Even if the potential site for the parking facility is low risk, the risk level could change in the future.
Emergency communications such as panic buttons and closed circuit television cannot compensate for a lack of CPTED; however, they can enhance CPTED in high-risk facilities, and all facilities should be designed so such enhancements can be easily installed.

Officials framing a municipal ordinance to mandate security features in parking facilities should consider requiring facilities to regularly submit an updated management plan that responds to the particular needs of a facility. The plan should include a risk audit and proposed CPTED and active security measures, such as emergency communications.

Target audience: municipal government officials, building owners and managers, urban planners, architects, and criminal justice professionals.

Because parking facilities are more likely settings for crime--both violent and property--than all other real estate except residential, security is one of the most critical issues facing the owners and operators of parking facilities today. Local government officials are also concerned about the security of these facilities--some of which are city owned or operated--because parking affects the economic viability of a community.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), which emphasizes the proper design and effective use of a created environment to reduce crime and enhance the quality of life, is particularly applicable to parking facilities. Incorporating CPTED can significantly reduce the fear and risk of crime as well as the considerable costs associated with hiring security personnel.

This Research in Brief offers an overview of up-to-date design concepts for parking facility security measures and other possible security and existing parking facility ordinances. The framework and rationale for a flexible plan to improve parking lot security is described.

**Crime in parking facilities**

Because parking facilities comprise a large area with relatively low levels of activity, violent crime is more likely to occur in a parking facility than in other commercial facilities. A typical suburban shopping center requires 1.5 square feet of parking space for every square foot of leasable retail space; office buildings generally need at least 1 square foot of parking space for every square foot of office space.

Therefore, a shopping center that consists of 1 million square feet will probably have 1.5 million square feet of parking. More than 10,000 people may be at a mall during the peak hours of a busy shopping day; however, only a small fraction will be in the parking lot, which is 1.5 times as large as the mall. This fact increases the likelihood that an individual can be isolated in a parking area and targeted for an attack, which, in turn, attracts people with criminal intent (see "How Safe Are Parking Facilities?").

Other features that make security difficult are simply inherent to parking facilities:

- Parked cars provide hiding places and impede the distribution of lighting.
- Most parking facilities are open to the public.
An offender's car is not likely to be noted as strange or memorable in a public parking facility.

Another factor that contributes to the problem of security in parking facilities is the increasing preference for parking garages over parking lots. Land is often too valuable, especially in urban areas, to devote to acres of surface parking; therefore, multilevel parking garages are often built to accommodate the increasing numbers of cars on the road (see "On the Road Again").

Parking garages, which are either partially or fully enclosed and elevated above grade, offer much less natural surveillance--a primary focus of CPTED--than an open single-level parking lot of the same capacity. Surveillance within an enclosed facility may be further constrained by sloping ramps on multiple floors, which are necessary to provide floor-to-floor circulation.

Security in all types of parking facilities has tended to be reactive rather than proactive and often is addressed only after an incident has occurred. Although it is relatively easy and inexpensive to incorporate CPTED concepts in parking facilities at the time of construction, it is often difficult and expensive to upgrade security at a later date, especially in parking garages that may have inherent design features that inhibit security.

**CPTED and active security strategies**

CPTED is particularly applicable to parking facility design because its principles of natural surveillance, access control, and territoriality (i.e., sense of control over an environment) all have roles in preventing crime in a parking facility.

Security design involves selecting the right building features, materials, and systems to meet established passive security and active security requirements. Passive security refers to physical design features such as lighting. All passive security measures essentially incorporate CPTED concepts. Active security refers to human activities that may or may not involve specialized equipment, such as security patrols, intercoms, and monitored closed circuit television (CCTV) systems.

Even though consultants who specialize in parking design have espoused the use of CPTED for almost 20 years, it has not yet taken hold in the industry. In 1979, the first edition of The Dimensions of Parking, published by the Urban Land Institute and authored by the Parking Consultants Council (PCC) of the National Parking Association (NPA), devoted an entire chapter to security design, most of which conforms to today's concept of CPTED.

Why then are so many parking facilities designed with little or no attention to security? Basically because most property owners and architects are not familiar with the basic principles of CPTED. Very little time is devoted to parking designs in typical architectural education programs, and assignments for such projects are often relegated to the most inexperienced members of architectural teams. As a result, active security systems are often needed to correct problems created by architectural designs that failed to incorporate CPTED.

**Specific CPTED concepts for parking facilities**

The following sections describe specific CPTED design concepts in these areas: lighting, natural
surveillance, stairtowers and elevators, access control, signs and graphics, and restrooms.

**Lighting**

Lighting is universally considered to be the most important security feature in a parking facility. Good lighting deters crime and produces a more secure atmosphere. It is one of the few facility features that has been documented to reduce crime in parking facilities.

Two case studies found that prior to the installation of a parking lot lighting system, the Fairmount Fair Mall in Camillus, New York, was experiencing a high level of car break-ins. The installation of a lighting system eliminated these break-ins, boosted mall patronage, and allowed the scope and frequency of security patrols to be reduced.

Similarly, the installation of an effective lighting system at the parking lot in Spring Valley Park in San Diego, California, eliminated robberies, vandalism, and burglaries. Vehicular accidents were also reduced, and children and the elderly began to use the park at night once again.

Although it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all aspects of lighting design, a few basic principles should be mentioned to illustrate how lighting design relates to security.

**Illuminance.** Illuminance is the intensity of light falling on a surface, measured in footcandles (English units) or lux (metric units). Illumination levels are different not only on horizontal planes, which are at different distances from the light source, but also at various angles. If you hold a light meter horizontally at any point, it usually gives a different reading than if you hold it vertically. Horizontal illuminance (i.e., illuminance of the horizontal plane) does little to aid in the visibility of vertical objects such as signs and keyholes. Therefore, vertical illuminance is an equally important consideration in parking facility lighting.

**Uniformity.** Uniformity is critical. Passing from light to dark areas creates problems for drivers because of the eye's inability to adjust rapidly. It is also imperative to get light into the edges of parking stalls rather than just into driving aisles. Maintaining an appropriate uniformity ratio avoids these problems. The uniformity ratio is expressed as either the maximum or average illuminance divided by the minimum illuminance. For example, if the average to minimum ratio is 3:1 and an average illuminance of 6 footcandles is desired, the minimum illuminance at any one point must be 2 footcandles.

**Glare.** Another important lighting consideration is glare. Glare reduces the contrast of an object against its background, making it difficult for the eye to perceive depth accurately. Glare is a potential hazard for all drivers but is particularly dangerous for senior citizens and other individuals with weak or impaired vision.

There is a fundamental conflict between obtaining vertical illuminance and eliminating glare. However, glare can be minimized by the careful selection and positioning of fixtures. For example, lights can be positioned over parked vehicles rather than in the center of drive aisles. In addition, with one-way traffic patterns, lights can be positioned near beams—using the latter as shields to reduce the glare that is created by approach angles. Some manufacturers of light fixtures now include built-in shields that reduce glare while providing some up-light for vertical illuminance.
Industry standards. The Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) Subcommittee on Off-Roadway Facilities sets what is generally considered the minimum standard for lighting design in parking facilities. However, the current IESNA recommendation for vertical illuminance is a subject of some controversy in the industry. Because the standard is virtually impossible to achieve in most parking facility designs, many designers have chosen to disregard it entirely. At the time of this writing, the IESNA subcommittee is revising its guidelines. New guidelines should be published by the end of 1996, and some change in the vertical illuminance standard is expected. The PCC of the NPA has also recommended guidelines, which are somewhat different from IESNA's.

The most basic of these lighting requirements are often not met, even in new parking structures. One of the leading experts in parking structure lighting in the United States has noted that the top three and most critical mistakes in lighting design are (1) lack of understanding of industry standards, (2) inadequate vertical illuminance, and (3) poor lighting uniformity. Level of service. Although security in all parking facilities would be measurably enhanced if it met IESNA standards, higher risk facilities ought to have even higher security standards. According to published IESNA standards, "These lighting levels are the lowest acceptable levels, consistent with the seeing task involved and the need to deter vandalism while at the same time meeting energy constraints."

Today, many owners of parking facilities are requiring higher lighting levels. The level of service (LOS) approach developed by the author for many different parking design criteria may be useful in selecting the desired level of lighting. Borrowed from the traffic engineering profession, the LOS approach is familiar to parking facility owners, city officials, and architects alike. Each LOS is represented by a grade: LOS A is a superior design, LOS B is above average, LOS C is average, and LOS D is below average but still passing.

IESNA's minimum standard is LOS D. PCC's standard for horizontal illumination is also LOS D by the time it is converted back to footcandles at the pavement. PCC's uniformity ratio standard, however, is LOS B or better. LOS A illumination levels for covered parking areas were determined on the basis of the lighting requirements of airports and shopping center parking facilities, which demand a higher level of lighting, and American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE)/IESNA energy standards.

Lighting fixtures selected for a parking facility must do more than just provide ample, glare-free lighting. As a key component of the security system, they must also be reliable, easy to maintain, able to withstand the elements, and protected from vandalism. In summary, if local officials wish to encourage or mandate security in parking facilities, the single most effective thing they can do is to require good lighting.

Concrete stain. Staining concrete is a cost-effective method of increasing general brightness and creating a sense of well-being. White stain on ceilings and beam soffits reflects light, thereby increasing uniformity. Depending on the circumstances, staining ceilings and beam soffits white may improve the lighting level of a particular design by as much as one level of service. A good quality concrete stain will last at least 10 years in these locations. Paint creates the same brightness but requires increased maintenance.
On the other hand, white stain on walls seems to encourage graffiti, which tends to hurt the perception of security. Instead of white stain, anti-graffiti coatings may be used on walls, if desired, to enable quick and easy cleaning.

**Natural surveillance**

Parking consultants consider natural surveillance—the ability to observe one's surroundings—to be the next most critical security design issue after lighting. Natural surveillance is easier to achieve in surface parking lots; however, relatively minor design changes can significantly improve natural surveillance in other types of parking lots and garages.

Although complicated sloping floor designs were the state of the art in parking garages 20 years ago, today the goal is generally to maximize flat parking areas and minimize ramps. This approach, which essentially produces a series of surface lots stacked vertically, possesses most of the inherent advantages of natural surveillance found in single-level parking lots.

Openness also enhances natural surveillance. Long-span construction and high ceilings create openness and aid in lighting the facility. Building codes currently require a minimum amount of openness on the exterior facade of parking facilities to provide natural ventilation. There is a real cost benefit to meeting the requirements for an open parking structure because the cost of sprinkling equipment and ventilation for enclosed garages is significant.

When possible, however, the openness of the facade should be maximized for crime prevention. For example, a code may only require openness on two sides; however, openness on four sides is preferable. Obviously, an underground structure cannot be open. However, grading the site down to open up the first level below grade or using area wells allows both natural light and ventilation to reach the lower level. This improves the perception of security and also may enhance natural surveillance—in the audible if not visible mode.

Building codes often require fire walls along common property lines, but these can be avoided if the structure is held back the required distance for unprotected openings. Conversely, providing openings along a side that is 6 to 10 feet away from the fire wall of an adjacent building does little for CPTED and requires extra security (such as patrols or alarms) to control access to the resulting alleyway.

Shear walls should be avoided, especially near turning bays and pedestrian travel paths. Where shear walls are required, large holes in such walls can improve natural surveillance.

Pedestrian paths should be carefully planned to concentrate egress. For example, bringing all pedestrians through one portal rather than allowing them to disperse through numerous exits improves the ability to see and be seen by others. Likewise, concentrating vehicular entrance and egress to a minimum number of locations is beneficial. Attendant booths, parking offices, and security stations should be located where attendants can directly monitor activity.

Dead-end parking areas as well as nooks and crannies in the general design of the parking facility should be avoided. Shrubbery should be planted away from the facility and kept trimmed to eliminate hiding places. The facility should always be well maintained; trash, beer cans, and graffiti may leave the impression that the facility is not secure.
Another means of enhancing natural surveillance is to bring retailers or restaurants into the area. Patrons frequent such establishments when activity in the parking facility would otherwise be low, thereby increasing natural surveillance of the property. The owners and employees of these businesses would also have a vested interest in the security of the parking facility.

**Stairtowers and elevators**
Historically, stairs, lobbies, and elevator cabs have been at highest risk for personal injury incidents in parking facilities. One of the main reasons is that they have typically been enclosed, small spaces that attract persons with criminal intent. Therefore, one of the most basic precepts of CPTED in parking design is to design stairtowers and elevator lobbies as open as code permits. The ideal solution is a stair and/or elevator waiting area totally open to the exterior and/or the parking areas. If a stair must be enclosed for code purposes or weather protection, glass walls can reduce or eliminate the incidence of both personal injury attacks and various types of vandalism. Potential hiding places below stairs should be closed off.

Other CPTED design elements include glass backs for elevator cabs and well-lighted elevator lobbies that are visible to both patrons in the parking areas and the public out on the street. When enclosure is required, as in underground parking garages, an automatic fire door, or for a larger opening, a rolling fire shutter with an access door, can be installed so that the area is wide open during normal use. Either the door or shutter would be closed by a smoke detector when needed.

**Access control**
Although natural surveillance may be adequate for low-risk facilities, higher risk ones often require access control. Access control and perimeter security are best considered in the initial design stage. Even if a potential parking facility site is in a low-risk area, the risk level may change in the future.

Security screening or fencing can be provided at points of low activity to discourage anyone from entering the facility on foot yet still maintain openness and natural surveillance. A system of fencing, grilles, and doors also may be designed to completely shut down access to the entire facility during unattended hours.

Any ground level pedestrian exits that open into nonsecure areas should be emergency exits only and fitted with panic bar hardware. Local alarms that activate if a ground level door is opened can be useful when an exit is intended for emergency use only.

Controlling vehicular access to a parking facility, even a public one, is extremely beneficial to security. Merely requiring the driver to take a ticket on entry (often observed by a security camera) and interact with a booth attendant at exit will make a facility less attractive to criminals than one that is wide open and unattended.

**Signs and graphics**
Careful placement of signs and graphics helps orient patrons and allows them to move quickly in and out of the parking facility, making them less vulnerable to attack. Color coding and/or unique memory aids also help patrons quickly relocate their parked vehicle when they return to the facility. Signs and graphics can also assure patrons that their safety is being monitored. Likewise, potential perpetrators may be deterred by a notice that they are under surveillance.

**Restrooms**
Parking facility owners, operators, and consultants all agree that public restrooms present a security problem because their use is infrequent and hiding places abound. Public restrooms are safer in office buildings and shopping centers where there is more activity. If they are provided in a parking facility, however, they should have maze-type entrances instead of outer/inner doors that could trap a victim.
Active security systems as CPTED enhancements
Emergency communications do not provide a complete solution to security problems in a parking facility and cannot compensate for a lack of CPTED. On the other hand, panic buttons, intercoms, sound surveillance, and CCTV can be practical enhancements to CPTED in a high-risk facility.

Panic buttons and emergency phones
Panic buttons are often located in elevators, lobbies, stairs, and occasionally in parking areas. Their value, however, is dependent on the victim reaching the button and sounding the alarm. A drawback of panic buttons is that they seem to be irresistible to pranksters. Telephones are another emergency communication device; however, they are more expensive to install and maintain and may be difficult to reach when trying to sound an alarm.

Intercoms
Panic buttons with voice-activated intercoms can be installed in all elevator cabs and fully enclosed stairwells. Two-way intercoms make it possible to communicate to the victim that help is on the way, possibly deterring the criminal. In recent years, a constant blue light that changes to strobe when a panic button is depressed has become a common accessory to panic/intercom systems. The strobe light may attract the attention of more distant parking patrons and cause the criminal to flee.

Sound surveillance
Sound-activated systems continue to be problematic. Standard voice-activated systems are generally not practical in parking areas due to background noise. Scream alarms filter out general background noise but identify screams and breaking glass. A drawback of these systems is that security personnel tend to tire of their irritating, routine sounds and turn off the sound activation.

CCTV
CCTV can provide multiple levels of surveillance; however, it is important to recognize its inherent strengths and weaknesses for it to be an effective component of an overall security plan.

CCTV can be used to detect personal assaults in enclosed areas (such as stairtowers) that are historically at highest risk. The knowledge that camera images can be recorded to a VCR, increasing the likelihood of identification and conviction, may deter the criminal. Parking areas may also be monitored by CCTV; however, parked vehicles, sloping floors, and shadows make it difficult to position cameras to fully cover all areas.

A recent advance in parking security is the development of a CCTV camera that rides a track back and forth down the length of parking aisles. The camera can see between parked vehicles, and a variety of devices can be used to trigger the camera to go to a specific location. The first working installation of the system was completed in a parking facility at Duke University Medical Center in 1993. As of this writing, the security staff is satisfied with the device and is planning to install others. A vertically mounted version of the system that could be used in stair and elevator towers is now in development. If complete CCTV coverage of a parking facility is necessary, these mobile cameras are more cost-effective and provide better coverage than standard pan-and-tilt cameras.

Comprehensive CCTV and emergency communication coverage throughout a parking structure adds as much as $400 per parking space (1995 dollars) to the construction cost of a new facility, but retrofit expenses can be double this amount. The CCTV must then be monitored by trained security officers and maintained by skilled technicians. In such situations, the combined cost of security expenses and liability insurance can represent 25 percent or more of a parking facility's total annual operating cost.

Security personnel
The visible presence of uniformed officers is one of the best crime prevention methods and should be considered in high-risk facilities. Unscheduled patrols who vary their routes throughout the shift appear to be most effective. In very high-risk situations, check-in stations at key locations should monitor and record the frequency of patrols. All security personnel should be trained to properly monitor, operate, and respond to all security equipment within the facility.
Selecting appropriate security features
When it comes to selecting appropriate security features, a one-size-fits-all approach will not work. All design processes involve balancing competing goals and objectives, and each project has its own balance. For example, in one situation, heavy landscaping and screening may be important to minimize the intrusion of a hospital parking facility into an adjacent residential neighborhood. However, if the hospital is located in a high-crime area, heavy landscaping and screening may be inappropriate.

In general, the selection of appropriate security features depends on the vulnerability to crime of various locations within the facility. The neighborhood in which a facility is located will usually have the greatest effect on this factor: The higher the general level of crime in a neighborhood, the greater the vulnerability of a particular facility.

Security audit
Before appropriate security features are selected, a security audit should be conducted. The audit involves developing an incident history and profile for a neighborhood by contacting the local police and the managers of nearby facilities. Using this information, facilities are classified as one of the following:

- Low risk -- Facilities in which minor vandalism and juvenile theft problems may occur, but no personal injury incidents and no professional theft activity may reasonably be anticipated.
- Moderate risk -- Facilities in which a vehicle theft may occur during nonbusiness hours, but there is no reason to anticipate personal injury attacks.
- High risk -- Facilities in which personal injury incidents have occurred, or a pattern of thefts might escalate to personal injury.

The security audit identifies isolated locations in moderate- and high-risk facilities and indicates appropriate active systems. In a moderate-risk facility, active systems are generally only installed in specific locations such as enclosed stairs. In high-risk facilities, a comprehensive security program is usually necessary.

Design features matched to risk level
The second step is to determine how the facility's design will affect security, either positively or negatively. In low-risk facilities, active systems are generally not necessary; however, the parking facility design should allow for later installation of active security systems in case the facility's risk level increases. For example, with just a little attention to detail in the initial design, control of the perimeter at grade can be easily accomplished later.

As the risk level increases, CPTED becomes a greater priority. Therefore, when conflicts arise between aesthetics and security, the degree of risk will determine whether the balance shifts toward CPTED. It is important to note, however, that many CPTED features can and should be provided in parking facilities at all risk levels.

In the past, parking facility owners have hesitated to document their rationale for the specific security measures employed at a facility because they were afraid that such documentation would be used against them in any litigation. However, experience has shown that documentation that shows a thoughtful, rational approach to security planning is of substantial benefit in court. Although experts may argue over exactly which measures should have been adopted, being able to show that options were carefully considered and that reasonable, prudent measures were taken to reduce risks generally reduces overall liability.

What can local officials do to encourage CPTED?
Although local officials are not often consulted in the design process, municipal governments do have a major influence on the design of buildings, and local officials can play a much stronger role in fostering good security planning.

Building codes
Building codes should reflect security considerations as well as the traditional concerns about effects on human life from such natural forces as wind and snow, fires, earthquakes, and tornados. Indeed, the threat to life from criminal
attack is far greater than that from fire in a parking structure. According to National Crime Victimization Study data, more than 500,000 violent crimes occurred in parking facilities (both lots and structures) in 1992, whereas a study of national fire data17 reported only 9 injuries--of which 6 were to fire fighters--and no deaths in 404 fires over a 3-year period.

A prime example of a building code requirement oriented to fire safety to the detriment of CPTED is the enclosure of exit stairs in open parking structures. These enclosed spaces that experience little activity provide natural hiding places and are prime locations for assaults. Because open parking structures allow for the dissipation of smoke and fumes, stair enclosures do not seem to be necessary for safety from fire.

National building codes have recognized this fact and no longer require enclosed stairs in open parking facilities. However, the National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code continues to require enclosed stairs, and many local officials feel obligated to enforce it. Local officials should consider meeting with officials of their fire departments to discuss how to balance the needs of fire safety and CPTED.

**Zoning ordinances**

Local zoning ordinances occasionally require that parking lots be totally screened with landscaping. They also limit light pole heights and constrain other elements that are critical to security design.

Local officials should consider reviewing and modifying ordinances to encourage CPTED. Local codes can require that the lighting of new parking lots and garages be designed in strict conformance with IESNA standards, as periodically revised and updated.

**How Safe Are Parking Facilities?**

Although there are no exact statistics available, a conservative appraisal based on national transportation data1 estimates nonresidential parking facilities are used 175 million times every day. Because an individual must walk through a parking facility twice, this number results in 350 million pedestrian trips through parking facilities each day.

In 1992, parking facilities represented the third most frequent place in which violent crime (e.g., rape, robbery, assault) occurred, averaging about 1,400 violent crimes per day. Therefore, it appears that the risk of being attacked in a parking facility, 4 in 1 million, is really quite low. Interestingly, about 20 percent of violent crime in parking facilities is committed by persons known to the victim.

Even though one-third of all violent crime occurs in residential settings, and a little over 24 percent occurs on nonresidential streets,4 the average American believes that walking through a parking facility is less safe than walking down the street in his or her own neighborhood. Television shows and theatrical films often feature attack scenes in parking garages, and press coverage of actual incidents often adds to the perception that these facilities are unsafe.

According to the 1990 National Personal Transportation Survey (NPTS), Americans average 1,042 personal trips per year (including commuting), or 2.85 trips per day. This figure does not include trips made on business, such as crosstown trips made in automobiles that are parked at the point of destination. NPTS also found that fewer than one-half of personal trips between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m. were journey-to-work trips.

Additional relevant statistics from the 1990 Census indicate there were 115 million working adults and 165 million registered drivers. From 1960 to 1990, the percentage of workers commuting by private automobile increased from 70 percent to 88 percent. Another 5 percent used transit systems, but most of these public transportation users drove to and parked in commuter parking facilities. AA CPTED should be a high priority in virtually all parking facility designs for the following reasons:

- Natural surveillance throughout the design is a low-cost crime prevention strategy.
- Although security may not be an issue in certain locations today, risk levels may change in the future.
- CPTED and active security measures lessen the likelihood that crime will occur and reduce the liability of the
parking facility owner if it does.

Retrofitting a facility to enhance CPTED is very expensive, if not impossible.

When CPTED features are absent from the general design, more active security systems are generally needed. These systems are costly because they are labor and equipment intensive.